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1 Introduction
Due to public pressure triggered by corruption scandals and human rights violations
linked to the Qatar 2022 World Cup, FIFA underwent a reformation process starting
in 2016 and introduced human rights requirements not only into their statutes but
also in their bidding process. We argued that the explicit inclusion of human rights
in FIFA #s Statutes since April 2016 exemplifies how transnational sports law (lex
sportiva) can undergo processes of eigen-constitutionalization that contribute to the
protection of human rights. Yet, this protection can be effective only when coupled to
regimes of reflexivity and enforceability. The legal-societal analysis of FIFA’s reform
process contributes to revealing society’s impact on transnational regimes and can
be used to develop a strategy to coordinate the leverage effects of society.
First, Teubner’s theory of societal constitutionalism on transnational regimes will be
used to provide a descriptive analysis of the processes of eigen-constitutionalization.
According to the theory, human rights as limitative rules need to be positivized
through processes forming a “patchwork quilt” constitution that entwines pressure
from NGOs, private ordering, contracts, decisions of arbitral tribunals, and decisions
of national courts. In a second step, the theory will be empirically compared against
FIFA’s reformation process. We detect a slowly evolving constitutional “patchwork
quilt” that already incorporates high levels of reflexivity but still lacks in effective
enforcement mechanisms for all directly affected persons.
2 Eigen-constitutionalization of transnational
regimes
FIFA is currently undergoing the worst crisis in its history. As a result of allocating
the 2018 and 2022 Football World Cups to Russia and Qatar respectively, corruption
inquiries were initiated, allegations of human rights violation were voiced, and the
geographic suitability of Qatar for hosting a Football World Cup was questioned. At
the same time, this crisis presented the unique opportunity for reform, resulting in
explicit human rights commitments that have materialized in FIFA’s Statutes as well
as in radical changes to the World Cup Bidding Process. In fact, this experience of
crisis may well have been FIFA’s “constitutional moment” (Teubner, 2012, p.81).
Teubner’s theory of societal constitutionalism is particularly sophisticated1)For critical
examination of the applicability of Teubner’s societal constitutionalism to lex sportiva
see Duval, “The Olympic Charter: A Transnational Constitution Without a State?”,
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Journal of Law and Society 45 (2018) pp. S245-S269. in accurately describing
transnational phenomena such as the normative regime of sports at the global
institutional level (lex sportiva). In the absence of unified global efforts by nation
states in regulating transnational non-state actors, the demand for legal rules and
compliance is filled by the relevant non-state actors themselves. The principle source
of transnational normative regimes, therefore, is the web of normative interactions
in and amongst all the relevant transnational actors. Societal constitutionalism takes
this paradigm shift into account. In the wake of an existential crisis, a transnational
regime such as FIFA may begin to eigen-constitutionalize by formulating limitative
rules that counteract self-destructive tendencies and limit damage to its social,
human, and natural environment. The proclamation of a commitment to human rights
can constitute such self-constraint. Like a “patchwork quilt”2)Klabbers, “Setting the
Scene”, in: Klabbers/Peters/Ulfstein (eds.), The Constitutionalisation of International
Law (2009), p. 23., human rights are positivized in transnational regimes through
iterative decision-making processes, which occur at the interconnected nodes of
arbitral tribunals, national courts, private contracts, social normative standards
and the actions of protest movements and NGOs. But while external pressure can
prompt a societal system in crisis to enact limitative rules in the shape of human
rights commitments, such rules can be reconstructed system-internally only in
alignment with that particular system’s ratio.3)Regarding ratio as the interlacing of
different rationalities in the context of social networks cf. Wielsch, “Die Ordnungen
der Netzwerke. AGB – Code – Community Standards“, in: Martin Eifert/Tobias
Gostomzyk (eds.), Netzwerkrecht. Die Zukunft des NetzDG und seine Folgen für die
Netzwerkkommunikation (2018), p. 67. This is where societal constitutionalism also
allows for targeted normative critique. In the case of FIFA, two central rationalities
are the dissemination and integrity of football as a sport as well as the pronounced
economic motive of making profits, which is typical of many transnational regimes
and makes them highly vulnerable to structural corruptibility. Such system-internal
rationalities may continuously evolve and adjust,4)Such internal developments then
allow for better alignment with system-external demands, cf. Teubner, Constitutional
Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization (2012), p. 85. but it is at
this site of potential conflict that the promises of eigen-constitutionalization may
encounter resistance, namely when limitative rules cannot be coupled effectively to
regimes of reflexivity and enforceability.
3 “Common Law Constitution”
Principally, FIFA’s reformation that started in 2016 is a positive contribution to the
evolution of a protective global human rights regime. In the following, we delineate
the various “patches” that form part of an evolving “common law constitution” of FIFA
aimed at protecting human rights while critically examining the normative fortitude of
FIFA’s human rights commitment through the lens of societal constitutionalism.
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3.1 Protest movements and NGOs
Public protest exercised through NGOs and critical journalism may not only force
transnational regimes into taking remedial actions on a case-by-case basis but
may also trigger learning impulses that generally change the internal code of
transnational regimes. Reputation is a precious asset. We detect that sustained
public pressure for over eight years by, amongst others, Human Rights Watch and
Amnesty International has included not only criticism but specific recommendations
for action, thus forming a potential layer of reflexivity. Given FIFA’s explicit human
rights commitment since April 2016, NGOs and journalists can monitor and report on
the level of FIFA’s compliance with the rules and standards FIFA has set for itself.
3.2 Private Ordering
The ongoing public pressure has also transformed the private ordering of FIFA. This
transformation includes the introduction of a new Art. 3 to the FIFA Statutes in which
FIFA commits itself to internationally recognized human rights (further spelled out
in FIFA’s Human Rights Policy) and new normative requirements for the World Cup
Bidding Process, notably the requirement for each bid to include a human rights
strategy. We conclude that both the new Art. 3 of the FIFA Statutes and the new
World Cup Bidding Process are sufficiently exhaustive in spelling out the exact
human rights standards against which FIFA’s and all FIFA-related activities ought to
be normatively assessed. Transparency is increased via independent observation
and reporting institutions such that relevant assessments can likely be undertaken.
Nonetheless, we also maintain that the new World Cup bidding requirements are
insufficient in spelling out specific secondary rules authorizing FIFA to enforce
specific punishments when adverse human rights impacts are caused by bidding
members, host countries, or host cities.
3.3 Contracts
The transnational regime of sports relies on a complex network of contracts. This
network now includes the requirement that bidders for the World Cup must secure
a Government Declaration and Host City Declarations which both include the
commitment to avoiding adverse human rights impacts. The same is requested
from entities responsible for the construction and renovation of stadiums, training
sites, hotels and airports. Furthermore, human rights commitments made during
the bidding phase, including those related to the newly introduced human rights
requirements, become binding on the host once the hosting agreement is signed.
This demonstrates FIFA’s explicit commitment to secure human rights in all societal
spheres that may be affected by FIFA-related activities. Still, the question of
sanctions and their enforceability remains an open question. The tightly clocked
rhythm of global sporting events makes withdrawing the host position highly
unattractive to all parties involved (even to the bidder who is awarded the host
position instead since she has less time to prepare). Even worse, delaying the World
Cup will bring disorder to the global sporting calendar and entail significant financial
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losses to all. Additionally, FIFA itself becomes highly dependent on the host once
preparations are underway, which constitutes a structural incentive to appease the
host through symbolic punishment rather than issuing proportionate sanctions. Thus,
a host will likely remain the host even when she commits human rights offenses.
This does not mean that sanctions are principally impossible or unenforceable.
FIFA could, for instance, prohibit teams of offending nation states from competing.
But much like it is the case with FIFA’s new private ordering, the possibility of such
sanctions and their enforcement mechanism remain underdetermined in FIFA’s
current network of contracts.
3.4 Arbitration Courts – Court of Arbitration for
Sport (CAS)
According to Teubner, the legal source of fundamental rights in transnational
regimes is to be found in a “social” positivization of fundamental rights through the
decision practices of transnational regimes themselves that enact fundamental rights
from within. Arbitration courts play the role of translators who instantiate norms,
specified to maintain the system’s ratio, into transnational law.
Here, the introduction of Article 3 in the April 2016 edition of FIFA’s Statutes marks
an interesting evolutionary step in the way sport related disputes are settled by the
CAS. Given that the new Article 3 now admits all internationally recognized human
rights into the Statutes, human rights no longer only apply subsidiarily (if at all) but
directly according to R 58 CAS Code. In this context, we analyzed numerous CAS
awards and observe that the existence and applicability of various procedural and
substantive human rights have been discussed by the CAS. In that sense, the new
Article 3 does not necessitate an entirely new human rights approach. Nonetheless,
now appellants are explicitly encouraged to make human rights violations a central
topic of discussion during arbitration.
However, enforceability regarding the Bidding Process is limited. Since the principle
of non-retroactivity does apply to rules, which govern the requirements for being
admitted to a competition, the introduction of human rights both in the Statutes
and the Bidding Process for 2026 has no legal effect on the selection of Qatar for
hosting the FIFA World Cup in 2022. Further, an appeal proceeding will shorten
the preparatory possibilities of a new World Cup host. These circumstances could
prevent appeals because of the risk of unmanageable time pressure.
3.5 National Courts
Adhering to the metaphor of eigen-constitutionalization as a “patchwork quilt”,
national courts participate in the gradual development of a common law of
transnational fundamental rights by recognizing and enforcing arbitral decisions or by
invoking ordre public and refusing to enforce transnational arbitral rulings because
they violate fundamental rights. To give a pertinent example: the Bangladeshi citizen
Nadim Shariful Alam (and others) filed a lawsuit against FIFA at the Commercial
Court of the Canton of Zurich, Switzerland. A central claim of the plaintiffs was that
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FIFA ought to redress ongoing human rights violations during the preparations
for the World Cup in Qatar. But the court ended up rejecting all claims, arguing
that essential procedural requirements had not been fulfilled. This does raise
the question whether it would be more appropriate for national courts to hold
powerful non-state actors responsible proportionate to their complicity in human
rights violations (a question that is also asked here). However, while stricter
transnational limitative rules set by national courts are theoretically possible, such
rules encounter their own practical limits when they collide with (local) legal interests
of sovereign states. As the court does state in obiter dictum (p.9), it is doubtful
whether the plaintiffs’ claim can, in the end, carry a legal interest worthy of protection
(“schutzwürdiges Interesse”), given that it would effectively require a Swiss Court to
issue a ruling – with the threat of punishment – which orders FIFA to influence the
political organization, judiciary and legal system of a sovereign foreign nation state.
4 Conclusion
FIFA’s reformation process, triggered by the World Cup bid in 2010, can be
appropriately analyzed as a process of eigen-constitutionalization. In general,
the societal constitutionalist lens draws attention to the fact that when there is no
unified global legislator to intermediate transnational political demands, it is the
leveraging effects of society and its predominantly private actors that become
increasingly important for limiting the negative effects of transnational regimes on
their environment. Commitments to human rights standards can fulfill this limitative
function by acknowledging destructive and domineering forces, and inscribing
appropriate countermeasures into regime specific strategies and self-regulative
measures. Human rights now feature in FIFA’s “common law constitution” as
limitative rules at various levels. The required re-specialization and regime-specific
application of human rights can be observed in FIFA’s reformation since 2016 and
already reveal high levels of reflexivity. But FIFA’s eigen-constitutionalization still
lacks in enforceability. FIFA has to remain creative when it comes to effectively
sanctioning human rights offenders in spite of antagonistic rationalities.
Using the idea of societal constitutionalism in the context of FIFA also draws
attention to the potential for societal institutions to counter the described limits of
self-regulation. To strengthen the enforceability of Article 3, human rights need to be
substantiated in evermore CAS proceedings in order to be effectively translated and
positivized. Interdisciplinary societal institutions (such as e. g. the Centre for Sport
and Human Rights) can help trigger this translation process by offering legal support
to appellants who could then bring effective, substantiated human rights cases
before the CAS. Acknowledging the impact of society on transnational regimes can
be used to develop regime-specific strategies that coordinate the leveraging effects
of society within the human rights context.
References
• 1. For critical examination of the applicability of Teubner’s societal
constitutionalism to lex sportiva see Duval, “The Olympic Charter: A
- 5 -
Transnational Constitution Without a State?”, Journal of Law and Society 45
(2018) pp. S245-S269.
• 2. Klabbers, “Setting the Scene”, in: Klabbers/Peters/Ulfstein (eds.), The
Constitutionalisation of International Law (2009), p. 23.
• 3. Regarding ratio as the interlacing of different rationalities in the context
of social networks cf. Wielsch, “Die Ordnungen der Netzwerke. AGB
– Code – Community Standards“, in: Martin Eifert/Tobias Gostomzyk
(eds.), Netzwerkrecht. Die Zukunft des NetzDG und seine Folgen für die
Netzwerkkommunikation (2018), p. 67.
• 4. Such internal developments then allow for better alignment with system-
external demands, cf. Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal
Constitutionalism and Globalization (2012), p. 85.
- 6 -
